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Tunisia’s 2018 municipal elections, in which a legislated quota was implemented and women 
won 47 percent of seats, raises questions about whether electing female councilors improves 
women’s representation in clientelistic settings. Using data from the Local Governance 
Performance Index (LGPI), an original survey of 3,600 Tunisians conducted in 2015 by the 
Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD), this paper investigates the relationship 
between local councilors’ gender and women’s access to help with personal or community 
issues. Three findings emerge. First, male citizens are thirteen percentage points more likely to 
know a local councilor and six percentage points more likely to have contacted a councilor for 
help. Second, citizens of both genders are twice as likely to contact a councilor of the same 
gender when asking for help with community problems. Finally, electing females increases 
women’s access to councilors, due to network homosociality—that is, denser personal networks 
with others of the same gender—but has a limited impact on men’s access because female 
councilors have more hetersocial networks. By showing that electing and appointing women 
improves service and allocation responsiveness to females, the results call attention to the need 
to address gender equity issues when drafting electoral laws and implementing decentralization 
laws. 
 
Keywords: Local councils, women’s representation, service provision, Middle East and North 
Africa, Tunisia  
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In 2018, seven years after the Arab uprisings, Tunisia held municipal elections, the first 
since the revolution that ousted former President Ben Ali in 2011. In response to the 2014 
constitutional provision, which commits the state to promoting gender parity in elected 
assemblies (Article 10), the 2018 municipal election law included a gender quota establishing 
vertical and horizontal parity for women on party lists in the country’s closed-list proportional 
representation (PR) electoral system. As a result, women won forty-seven percent of seats in 
local councils in May 2018. 
Tunisia first implemented a gender quota at the national, regional, and local levels under 
Ben Ali, when the dominant ruling Constitutional Rally for Democracy (RCD) party occupied 
most seats in the nation’s assemblies. Nationally, women won twenty-three percent of seats in 
parliament in 2004, and the number rose to twenty-eight percent in 2009. Locally, women won 
twenty-seven percent of seats in the 2010 municipal elections.1 Following the revolution that 
same year, a legislated quota was implemented for the country’s first free and fair elections to 
the Constituent Assembly. These elections resulted in twenty-eight percent of seats in 2011 and 
thirty-one percent in 2014 for women in the first two parliaments.2 
                                                          
1 Estimates vary. One report estimates women made up 33.6 percent of local council seats 
following the 2010 municipal elections Clement M. Henry, “Countries at the Crossroads 2011: 
Tunisia” (Freedom House), accessed November 11, 2018, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/TUNISIAfinal.pdf. 
2 Lindsay J. Benstead, “Tunisia,” in Global Handbook on Women’s Political Rights, ed. Susan 
Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Netina Tan, 2019. 
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Yet, despite the strong role women play in Tunisia’s local governments, little is known 
about how women’s presence affects service and allocation responsiveness to females. Are 
women more able to ask for personal services and community needs when more women hold 
office? This question is an important one, due to the importance of informal networks for 
accessing individual and public services in clientelistic settings with weak local councils, as is 
the case in Tunisia. 
Most literature examining the impact of quotas on substantive representation of women 
focuses on national parliaments.3 Studies of local and regional governance have been more 
limited than national-level studies, due to the difficulty of collecting local-level data, such as the 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Lindsay J. Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Improve Women’s Access to 
Services in Clientelistic Regimes,” Governance 29, no. 2 (2016): 185–205, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12162; Lindsay J. Benstead, Amaney A. Jamal, and Ellen Lust, “Is 
It Gender, Religiosity or Both? A Role Congruity Theory of Candidate Electability in 
Transitional Tunisia” 13, no. 1 (2015): 74–94, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714003144; 
Susan Franceschet and Jennifer M. Piscopo, “Gender Quotas and Women’s Substantive 




gender makeup of local councils. But, an increasing number of studies of India,4 Lesotho,5 and 
other countries examine women’s representation at the local level. Several studies find a positive 
impact on women’s representation. In India, female local council heads were more responsive to 
women’s requests, including help with police corruption and landlord exploitation, and requests 
sometimes influenced policymaking.6 Chattopadhyay and Duflo showed that provision of public 
goods that are important to women, such as nearby drinking water, was higher in Indian districts 
headed by females.7 Similarly, Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova found that 
citizens living in districts with female-headed local councils were less likely to exhibit hostile 
sexism and more likely to support women as political leaders, a form of symbolic 
                                                          
4 Rohini Pande, “Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income 
Democracies” 3, no. 1 (2011): 215–237, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-
080154. 
5 Amanda Clayton, “Electoral Gender Quotas and Attitudes toward Traditional Leaders: A Policy 
Experiment in Lesotho,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 33, no. 4 (2014): 1007–
1026, https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21789. 
6 Neema Kudva, “Engineering Elections: The Experiences of Women in Panchayati Raj in 
Karnataka, India,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 16, no. 3 (2003): 445–
463, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022312613488. 
7 Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a 
Randomized Policy Experiment in India,” Econometrica 72, no. 5 (2004): 1409–43. 
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representation.8 Yet, Clayton finds that local quotas have either no effect or a negative effect on 
women’s political engagement in Lesotho.9 
To assess the substantive (i.e., service, allocation, and policy) effects of electing women 
to local government, this paper takes advantage of Tunisia’s high level of representation of 
women in local councils (twenty-seven percent nationally in 2010) and data from the Tunisian 
Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI), an original survey conducted among 3,600 
Tunisians in 2015 by the Governance and Local Development Center (GLD).10 The LGPI offers 
a sufficiently large number of respondents to permit analysis of subsamples of citizens who have 
contacted local officials and to compare proportions across municipalities.  
                                                          
8 Lori Beaman et al., “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 124, no. 4 (2009): 1497–1540, https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1497. 
9 Clayton, "Electoral Gender Quotas and Attitudes toward Traditional Leaders: A Policy 
Experiment in Lesotho.” Other studies at the national level also show limited or no symbolic 
impacts of electing women. See for example, Pär Zetterberg, “Do Gender Quotas Foster 
Women’s Political Engagement?: Lessons from Latin America,” Political Research Quarterly 
62, no. 4 (2009): 715–730, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908322411. Tiffany D. Barnes and 
Stephanie M. Burchard, “Engendering” Politics: The Impact of Descriptive Representation on 
Women’s Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 7 
(2013), https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414012463884. 




Two outcomes are of interest: Service and allocation responsiveness.11 Service 
responsiveness refers to assisting constituents with individualized services, such as help with 
licenses, government documents, or jobs. Allocation responsiveness refers to attracting district 
projects or resolving community needs. Policy responsiveness refers to lawmaking. Service, 
allocation, and policy responsiveness—that is, “advancing women’s interests through ... policy 
making.12—make up substantive representation. In clientelistic and transitional contexts, where 
councils and parliaments have limited if any lawmaking prerogatives and informality is critical 
in local politics, service and allocation responsiveness are essential functions of elected and 
appointed bodies. 
The findings show that electing female local councilors improves service and allocation 
responsiveness to women, in the form of increased interactions between women and local 
councilors, which fosters their ability to request help with personal or community problems or to 
                                                          
11 Pitkin and Eulau and Karps conceptualized four dimensions of responsiveness (i.e., 
representation): Service, policy, allocation, and symbolic responsiveness. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 
The Concept of Representation. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). Heinz Eulau 
and Paul D. Karps, “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness,” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1977): 233–254, https://doi.org/10.2307/439340. 
12 Most research on substantive representation has been conducted in developed democracies and 
thus construed as policy responsiveness. See, e.g., Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and 
Jennifer M. Piscopo, The Impact of Gender Quotas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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express an opinion.13 The LGPI shows that male citizens are thirteen percentage points more 
likely to know a councilor than are women and 6 percentage points more likely to contact a 
councilor. Yet, electing women increases women’s access to local councilors, due to 
homosociality—that is, the tendency to have denser networks with others of the same gender.14 
This is especially true of request for community concerns, two-thirds of which are often made 
through male-male or female-female networks. When asking for help with community issues, 
male and female citizens are twice as likely to contact a councilor of the same gender. Electing 
and appointing women supports women’s service and allocation representation while having a 
limited impact on men’s representation because female councilors have more heterosocial 
networks that include male citizens.  
The findings underscore the need for gender quotas to improve women’s access to local 
councilors and for policymakers to consider gender equity when implementing decentralization 
laws. The findings also suggest that while electing women helps level the gender gap in access to 
councilors in clientelistic settings, doing so does not automatically eliminate underlying power 
hierarchies. Most requests for major infrastructure and public works projects occur in male-male 
                                                          
13 It is impossible to gauge how successful these interactions are, but the results show that female 
citizens are more able to meet female legislators than male legislators about community issues. 
14 Elin Bjarnegård, Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment: Explaining Male 
Dominance in Parliamentary Representation, Gender and Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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dyads. This may be due to network homosociality, men’s greater economic power and clout, and 
male professional competencies, which are often related to roads, water, and construction.  
Tunisia is a hard case to find an impact of electing women on responsiveness to female 
citizens, due to its history of state-sponsored feminism and strong role of women in politics. 
Thus, electing women is likely to an even greater impact on women’s service and allocation 
responsiveness in other societies in Africa and the Middle East (MENA). 
The Importance of Personal Networks and Clout in Tunisia’s Local Politics  
During the Ben Ali era, mayors and municipal councils were elected, but were fiscally 
and administratively dependent on the central government and appointed governors through a 
system of tutelle (guidance).15 Under a law passed in the 1980s designed to consolidate power 
under the central government, local councils had limited revenue and policymaking prerogatives, 
making them largely dependent on Tunisia’s central government.16 Decentralization was a 
“fiction.”17 According to Clark, Dalmasso, and Lust, “a variety of forms of tutelle and oversight 
                                                          
15 Janine Clark, Emanuela Dalmasso, and Ellen Lust, “Not the Only Game in Town: Local-Level 
Representation in Transitions,” Working Paper 15, 2017, http://gld.gu.se/media/1325/lust-
dalmasso-clark-final.pdf. 
16 The central government set the parameters of the taxation system. Municipalities collected tax 
on land, industrial establishments, and hotels. Clark, Dalmasso, and Lust. 
17 Néji Baccouche, as cited in Sarah Yerkes and Muasher Marwan, “Decentralization in Tunisia: 
Empowering Towns, Engaging People,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 17, 
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reduced the municipality’s role during the Ben Ali period largely to the management of buildings 
and services, primarily trash collection.”18 Municipalities managed urban planning, but had little 
influence over health, education, and other vital services.19 
Moreover, the RCD controlled political life through its national headquarters and local 
branches. The system of tutelle fostered municipal councils in which personal status, clout, and 
connections within the party, regional and central government and professional associations 
shaped what councilors could do. Councilors’ role was largely to provide personal services such 
as government documents and, when possible, to influence public spending on infrastructure and 
public works, including electricity, water, or roads. 
Despite Tunisia’s political transition in 2011, a new decentralization law has not been 
passed and political clientelism remains prominent in local politics.20 Clientelism differs from 
                                                          
2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/17/decentralization-in-tunisia-empowering-towns-
engaging-people-pub-76376. 
18 Interview with Mokhtar Hammami, the general director of the General Direction of Public 
Local Collectivities (GDPLC), conducted by Clark, Dalmasso, and Lust, “Not the Only Game in 
Town: Local-Level Representation in Transitions”, 10.  
19 Yerkes and Marwan, “Decentralization in Tunisia.” 
20 Clientelism is an “informal relationship between two actors of asymmetrical socioeconomic 
power where the patron … controls … resources … clients pursue but often cannot receive 
otherwise” Luigi Manzetti and Carole J. Wilson, “Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain 
11 
 
service responsiveness (i.e., casework) or allocation responsiveness (i.e., district projects), two 
dimensions of democratic representation.21 Clientelism is accessed and distributed through 
informal networks, is not transparent, and does not foster government accountability through 
bureaucratic oversight or legislation. Yet, while local councils have a limited formal role in 
policymaking or budgetary control, they are important intermediaries between the central 
government and the population and are thus well placed to influence decisions about local 
governance.22  
Clientelistic responsiveness constitutes a form of women’s representation when women 
and women’s groups are served in equal measure to men.23 As marginalized members of 
society—and particularly the most patriarchal societies—women often need help accessing 
government services and resolving bureaucratic bottlenecks. Yet, they are less likely to have 
linkages with political elites than male citizens. Women’s access to local councilors is critical for 
                                                          
Public Support?,” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 8 (2007): 949–970, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005285759.. 
21 Eulau and Karps, “The Puzzle of Representation.” 
22 Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Improve Women’s Access to Services in Clientelistic 
Regimes.” 
23 Lisa Blaydes and Safinaz El Tarouty, “Women’s Electoral Participation in Egypt: The 
Implications of Gender for Voter Recruitment and Mobilization,” The Middle East Journal 63, 
no. 3 (2009): 364–380, https://doi.org/10.3751/63.3.11. 
12 
 
addressing personal requests and is a pathway for allocation and policy representation. 24 This is 
particularly true when women ask for help with community needs, such as education, water, or 
roads.25 
Explaining Gender Gaps in Contacting Local Councilors 
Despite the importance of local councils’ responsiveness to personal and community 
needs to margined groups, little is known about how women’s presence affects service and 
allocation responsiveness to women at the local level. Clientelistic settings like Tunisia, where 
councils are weak and dependent on relationships with the regional and central government, have 
been shown to limit women’s access to elected and appointed officials.26 This is due to the 
numerical dominance of men and the tendency toward homosociality in service networks (i.e., 
friendships, collaborations, and other non-romantic relationships with others of the same 
gender).27 Bjarnegård argues, men have advantages accumulating homosocial capital—that is, 
predictable relationships with individuals who are similar and have resources needed to win 
elections—due to their numerical dominance in politics. Women’s underrepresentation in 
                                                          
24 Kudva, “Engineering Elections.” 
25 Pande, “Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance?” 
26 Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Improve Women’s Access to Services in Clientelistic 
Regimes.” 
27 Jean Lipman-Blumen, “Toward a Homosocial Theory of Sex Roles: An Explanation of the Sex 
Segregation of Social Institutions,” Signs 1, no. 3 (1976): 15–31, https://doi.org/10.1086/493272. 
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government leads to lower rates of clientelistic service provision to women28 that can also limit 
substantive representation of women’s issues.  
Homosocial capital is composed of instrumental and expressive resources.29 Expressive 
resources are dispositional similarities which facilitate close, predictable relationships and access 
to instrumental resources needed to succeed in campaigns.30 Men and women often prefer 
friendship and collaboration, including political networking and cooperation, with others of the 
same gender, due to greater ease relating (e.g., similar behavior and interests, fewer conflicts and 
sexual harassment concerns, higher trust). Yet, male dominance in political life is reproduced 
because instrumental and expressive resources are seldom in opposition for men. Males have 
more instrumental resources and can rely on homosocial linkages with other men, with whom 
they connect easily. In contrast, women must foster heterosocial networks to obtain resources, 
while enjoying less expressive resources, such as trust and familiarity, in networks with men.31  
                                                          
28 Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Improve Women’s Access to Services in Clientelistic 
Regimes.” 
29 Bjarnegård, Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment. 
30 Bjarnegård. 
31 Bjarnegård; Herminia Ibarra, “Homophily and Differential Returns: Sex Differences in 
Network Structure and Access in an Advertising Firm,” Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 
3 (1992): 422–447, https://doi.org/10.2307/2393451. 
14 
 
 Exclusion of women from service provision occurs through mutually-reinforcing 
structural and dispositional factors operating on the supply and demand-side of exchanges.32 On 
the instrumental, supply-side, patriarchal structures limit female deputies’ instrumental resources 
needed to provide services. Because women have less dense clientelitsic networks with the 
regional and national government and their parties—and because they are less often in 
professions relevant to local governance in Tunisia (e.g., public works)—they are also less able 
to impact substantive outcomes, especially public goods that require more clout than personal 
services to influence. Fewer citizens may approach female members for help, particularly if they 
perceive that a male councilor would be better placed to address their request. Women’s 
diminished ability to use elected and appointed officials as a source of wasta (intermediary) can 
also have symbolic effects.33 If female leaders enjoy fewer patronage networks,34 they will be 
                                                          
32 Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Improve Women’s Access to Services in Clientelistic 
Regimes.” 
33 In the Arab world, clientelism is a form of wasta (using connections, an intermediary) through 
which loyalty to family, tribe, religion, and sect is used to achieve mutually beneficial exchanges 
of interests. Basem Sakijha and Sa’eda Kilani, Wasta: The Declared Secret. Amman: Arab 
(Archives Institute, 2002). 
34 Aili Mari Tripp, “The Politics of Autonomy and Cooptation in Africa: The Case of the 




less likely to be seen as good sources of wasta (intermediary) and are less able to run in and win 
elections.35  
 Patriarchal norms limit female deputies’ interactions with male elites, due to social 
norms (i.e., the expressive, supply side) and female citizens’ interaction and networks with male 
deputies (i.e., the expressive, demand side). Patriarchal structures exclude women from public 
space (e.g., employment, politics), giving them fewer resources and influence (i.e., the 
instrumental, demand side). Women are less likely to be politically engaged36 or lead civil 
society groups, Sufi brotherhoods, and tribes, whose support is critical for winning elections. The 
Transitional Governance Project finds voting in first post-uprisings parliamentary elections is 
seventy-seven percent for Egyptian men, fifty-eight percent for women; seventy-five percent for 
Tunisian men, sixty-five percent for women; and eighty-four percent for Libyan men, fifty-nine 
percent for women.37 Females are perceived as less able to deliver votes and thus as less 
strategically important to target with services.  
                                                          
35 Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Improve Women’s Access to Services in Clientelistic 
Regimes.” 
36 Ethan M. Bernick and Sabri Ciftci, “Utilitarian and Modern: Clientelism, Citizen 
Empowerment, and Civic Engagement in the Arab World,” Democratization 22, no. 7 (2014): 1–
22, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.928696. 
37 Lindsay J. Benstead and Ellen Lust, “Women’s Political Participation in North Africa: Lessons 




A few surveys including the Constituent Survey38 in Morocco and Algeria and the 
Tunisian Post-Election Survey39 conducted by the author, offer evidence that women are less 
able to access help from local councilors. As shown by the 2007 Constituent Survey, in 
Morocco, twenty-six percent of men and sixteen percent of women had contacted a member of a 
local council in the previous five years—a gap of ten percent. In Algeria, twenty-nine percent of 
men and twenty percent of women asked for help from a local councilor—a gap of nine percent. 
Fewer constituents overall had contacted a regional official than a local official and the gender 
gap was smaller—zero percent in Morocco and five percent in Algeria (see Figure 1). The data 
                                                          
38 Lindsay J. Benstead and Ellen Lust, “Constituent Survey,” 2007-2008. The Constituent 
Surveys were nationally representative survey conducted in Morocco and Algeria in 2007-2008 
among 800 in each country.  
39 In the 2012 Tunisian Post Election Survey (TPES), a different survey conducted three years 
before the LGPI, seventeen percent of men and sixteen percent of women reported that they had 
contacted a member of the local council since the revolution. This is a non-significant difference. 
Lindsay J. Benstead and Ellen Lust, “Tunisian Post Election Survey (TPES),” 2012, 
http://transitionalgovernanceproject.org/. The TPES was conducted among 1,220 constituents in 
2012 by Lindsay Benstead and Ellen Lust and is part of the Transitional Governance Project. 
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show that gender gaps in access to services are at least as large as the local and regional levels of 
government than for national parliamentarians.40 
Figure 1. Percentage contacting local and regional councilors in the last five years in 
Morocco and Algeria 
 
 
Source: Constituent Survey. Question wording: Local Councils (APCs) Have you or any member 
of your household tried either successfully or unsuccessfully to contact an elected official of your 
local council to seek help with a personal problem, to seek help with a social or economic 
problem your community is facing, or to express an opinion? No(=1), Yes(=1), Yes we tried, but 
could not contact(=1). Regional Councils (APWs) As above (“APW“). 
  
 
                                                          
40 Mounah Abdel-Samad and Lindsay J. Benstead, “Why Do Islamist Parties Reduce the Gender 
Gap in Service Provision to Women?” (Kansas State University, 2016). For additional analysis, 




























Existing literature shows that women’s access to national parliamentarians increases the 
more females hold office.41 Afrobarometer data suggest women are less likely to contact 
parliamentarians: 11.7 percent of Moroccan men, compared to 3.5 percent of women (p < 0.000) 
and 2.2 percent of Algerian men, compared to 1.7 percent of Algerian women (p < 0.533) had 
contacted a parliamentarian in the previous year.42 Examining Morocco and Algeria, Benstead 
found that, on average, 20–29 percent of requests in both countries come from women, but 
female parliamentarians are more likely to serve women than are male deputies. Moreover, 
according to the Arab Barometer,43 56.6 percent of men and 43.4 percent of women in six Arab 
countries used wasta (intermediary) of any type during the last five years.  
Yet, electing women to local councils can reduce these gaps by increasing women 
citizens’ homosocial capital and thus their demand for services and community goods. 
Accordingly, I expect that female citizens will be less likely to be able to contact local councils 
than men, due to the numerical dominance of men in local government and male citizens’ 
advantages accumulating homosocial capital, which allows them to interact with and contact 
councilors more easily (H1). The gender gap in contacts will decrease as more females hold local 
office because females will be more able to seek services from female members than from male 
members, due to homosociality in networks.  This will occur because females will be more likely 
                                                          
41 Abdel-Samad and Benstead; Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Improve Women’s 
Access to Services in Clientelistic Regimes.” 
42 “Afrobarometer,” accessed November 28, 2018, http://www.afrobarometer.org/. 
43 “Arab Barometer,” Wave 1, 2008 2006, http://www.arabbarometer.org/. 
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to contact female than male councilors for help with personal and community requests (H2).  
However, since female political leaders are more likely to have heterosocial networks—due to 
their need to mobilize support from men as well as women—electing females will have a limited 
impact on males’ access to councilors.44 Males, I expect, will be as likely to contact female 
councilors as male councilors for help with personal and community requests (H3). 
Hypotheses: 
H1: Women will be less likely than men to know and contact local councilors. 
H2: Women will be more likely to contact female than male councilors for help with personal 
and community requests. 
H3: Men will be as likely to contact female councilors as male councilors for help with personal 
and community requests. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 The data used to test these hypotheses are from the Local Governance Performance Index 
(LGPI), a survey of nearly 3,600 Tunisians conducted in February 2015 by the Program on 
Governance and Local Development (GLD). The survey includes approximately 200 interviews 
in each of 18 municipalities (Table 1). The LGPI’s large sample size of 3,600 respondents allows 
for fine-grained analysis of a relatively uncommon experience of contacting local officials. 
About 489 respondents (fourteen percent of the sample) had asked a local councilor for help in 
the previous year.  
                                                          





 The municipalities represent a wide range of urban and rural districts located in the North 
and Center of the country and have varying economic profiles. The rate of water hookup in 
homes is lowest in Siliana-Nord/Ville (70.1 percent) and highest in Sfax-Ville (98.0 percent). 
Sfax is a regional hub, while Siliana is located 127 km from the closest major city (Table 1). 
Citizens in the selected municipalities have varying access to local councilors. The 
proportion who contacted a councilor for help with a personal problem, community issue, or to 
express an opinion varies from seven percent in Souassi (governorate of Mahdia) to thirty 
percent in Moknine (governorate of Monastir). The gender of the councilors who were contacted 
also varies. In some districts (Jebel-Jelloud, Bizerte-Nord, Bizerte-Sud, Ksour-Essaf, Souassi, 
and Bou-Arada) none of the citizens who contacted a local councilor indicated that the councilor 
was female, while the proportion of contacts with female councilors reached twenty-nine percent 
in Cite-El- Khadra, a municipality in Tunis. The proportion of women who have asked for help 
from any councilor ranges from one percent in Jebel-Jelloud (governorate of Tunis) to twenty-




Table 1. Characteristics of municipalities 
Governorate Municipality Region 
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Sfax Sfax-Ville Center East 0.0% 98.00 1.00 25.4% 18.0% 18.9% 
Sfax Sfax-Sud Center East 0.0% 88.70 2.00 13.3% 14.3% 13.6% 
Sfax Sakiet- Eddaier Center East 0.9% 92.90 5.00 14.3% 10.7% 13.9% 
Tunis Jebel-Jelloud North East 0.0% 97.60 5.00 2.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
Tunis Cite-El- Khadra North East 0.0% 97.70 6.00 9.4% 29.4% 5.7% 
Tunis La-Marsa North East 0.5% 96.10 19.00 13.9% 4.6% 15.2% 
Monastir Monastir Center East 2.1% 94.90 22.00 25.4% 27.6% 18.0% 
Monastir Moknine Center East 17.3% 92.10 36.00 29.9% 12.5% 26.7% 
Monastir Teboulba Center East 100.0% 93.10 42.00 11.3% 16.7% 9.3% 
Bizerte Menzel-Jemil North East 37.1% 94.30 59.00 8.8% 11.8% 6.7% 
Mahdia Mahdia Center East 10.2% 93.70 60.00 14.2% 4.4% 14.0% 
Bizerte Bizerte-Nord* North East 12.9% 95.40 65.00 9.1% 0.0% 4.8% 
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Bizerte Bizerte-Sud* North East 20.4% 74.30 65.00 8.4% 0.0% 5.9% 
Mahdia Ksour-Essaf Center East 97.9% 84.10 70.00 8.5% 0.0% 1.1% 
Mahdia Souassi Center East 50.7% 58.60 81.00 7.5% 0.0% 4.4% 
Siliana Bou-Arada North West 54.5% 69.50 93.00 16.9% 0.0% 8.1% 
Siliana Gaafour North West 97.1% 72.50 110.00 16.6% 6.3% 17.9% 
Siliana Siliana-Ville North West 16.7% 70.104 127.004 11.3% 15.8%  2.9% 






Representation in Local Councils 
 Local elections were held in May 2010 shortly before the December 2018-January 2019 
revolution. Since local elections had not yet taken place, some mayors and councilors who were 
elected in 2010 under Ben Ali were still in power when the LGPI was administered in February 
2015. However, immediately following the departure of Ben Ali, the government took steps 
through the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to replace local councils with appointed Special 
Delegations made up of protesters and activists until new local elections could take place. 
According to Mokhtar Hammami, general director of the General Direction of Public Local 
Collectivities (GDPLC), the Ministry of Interior (MOI) directive issued on January 14, 2011 
calling on governors to propose lists of activists and protesters who had been involved in local 
affairs but not in formal politics under Ben Ali.45 The Islamist Ennahda party won a plurality of 
seats (thirty-seven percent) in the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections and governed in a Troika 
with two leftist parties, CPR and Ettakatol.  
The Troika’s continued efforts to replace the local councils were only partially 
successful. While Ennahda wanted to make the local governments more representative of the 
parties in power and the Troika after the revolution, they succeeded in creating Special 
Delegations to replace local councils only where existing councils had less support of leftist 
parties and weaker links with the national union, the UGTT. Yet, changes in the SD between 
2011 and 2015 were made in sixteen of the eighteen municipalities included in the LGPI survey. 
                                                          




Some SDs were short lived and changed again between 2015 and 2018, after the survey was 
conducted.46  
 The MOI directive called on governors to “list the human resources available within the 
administration, and the apolitical persons, those who have never been involved in politics 
before—persons that have been involved in public affairs before but not in politics, and also 
young people and women” in order to dissolve municipal councils and replace them all with 
Special Delegations.”47 Including women would have been natural, since women are well-
represented in Tunisia’s civil society movements and political life more broadly and thus provide 
a pool for recruitment. Moreover, the Islamist Ennahda party, which held a plurality of seats in 
the Constituent Assembly, promoted women in their ranks. Women made up 41 percent of 
Ennahda’s deputies and three-quarters of all the women elected to the Constituent Assembly. 
Ennahda also utilized large numbers of women in party offices to mobilize voters. The party had 
240 Women’s Committees to campaign in all of Tunisia’s 24 wilayat, with 320 women acting as 
heads of these committees.48 
                                                          
46 Some governors and secretary generals also changed. 
47 Interview with Mokhtar Hammami, the general director of the General Direction of Public 
Local Collectivities (GDPLC), conducted by Clark, Dalmasso, and Lust, “Not the Only Game in 
Town: Local-Level Representation in Transitions.” 12. 
48 Andrea Khalil, “Tunisia’s Women: Partners in Revolution,” The Journal of North African 
Studies 19, no. 2 (March 15, 2014): 186–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2013.870424. 
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Thus, in asking about citizens interactions with local councilors since the 2010 elections, 
this paper examines a mix of local councils, both those elected in 2010 as well as, in some cases, 
those appointed by the Troika after the revolution. In the districts included in the LGPI, the 
proportion of women in these SDs ranged from zero percent in Bou-Arada (governorate of 
Mahdia), Teboulba (governorate of Monastir), and Essouassi (governorate of Siliana) to forty-
two percent in La Marsa (governorate of Tunis).49 In those that did not have SDs, the proportion 
of women was likely around 27 percent, due to the RCD’s voluntary party quota of thirty percent 
in 2010. Citizens reported their interactions with local councilors, who could have been from 
their municipality or another municipality. 
Service and Community Goods Requests 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of times that citizens contacted a local councilor about an 
issue in the year preceding the survey. Since respondents could ask for more than one request in 
a single meeting, the proportion of requests exceeds one hundred percent. In Tunisia, the most 
common requests were for roads and government licenses and documents. Thirty-four percent of 





                                                          
49 Author’s records based on decrees contained in “Official Gazette of the Republic of Tunisia,” 






Figure 2. Reasons for contacting a local councilor in Tunisia (Percentage of total requests) 
 
Source: LGPI. Four bars for each service type sum to more than one-hundred percent because 
respondents can state more than one type of service requested. Question wording: “(The last time 
you contacted a member of the local council) what type of issue did you address?” 
 
Other, unspecified types of requests that were not captured by the response categories 
accounted for twelve percent, housing made up eleven percent of requests, and electricity 
accounted for nine percent. Less common requests included employment (seven percent), water 
(seven percent), healthcare (four percent), transportation and telephone (two percent, 
respectively), and education (one percent). This suggests that despite having limited tax 
resources or administrative autonomy, local councilors are able to influence allocation of public 
works, such as roads and electricity. It also suggests an important role of clientelistic 
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relationships in accessing and providing government services, with potentially deleterious effects 
on equal access for women and men. 
Request Type and Volume by Councilor Gender 
Citizens brought different types of requests to male and female councilors. As shown in 
Figure 3, requests for large public works projects were made overwhelmingly to male councilors. 
One hundred percent of requests for help with water and transportation were made to male 
councilors; ninety-four percent of requests for healthcare and ninety-two percent of requests for 
roads (p<.01) were made to men. Similar proportions—ninety-one percent of requests for 
electricity and housing (p<.05)—were made to men. Ninety percent of requests for help for 
employment.  
This may because men are more likely to have professional competencies and networks 
in construction and industrial fields, greater political clout, and denser political networks needed 















Figure 3. Requests by local councilor gender 
 
Source: LGPI. ***p<.001, **p<.01, p<.05. Question wording: (The last time you contacted an 
official) was the member you contacted male or female? 
 
In contrast, female councilors are more often approached to provide help with education, 
telephone, government documents (p<.001), and “Other,” unspecified requests. Although fewer 
than one percent of all requests are for education, forty percent are made to female councilors. In 
addition, twenty-nine percent of requests for telephone services (which make up only two 
percent of all requests made to councilors) are made to female councilors, while eighteen percent 
of requests for government documents and licenses are directed toward female councilors. 
Female councilors receive fewer requests overall, and when they are approached, it is rarely 
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regarding public works. This suggests that female citizens face two types of disadvantages: they 
have fewer chances to meet councilors and when they do, they meet with women, who are 
relatively unlikely to address community issues such as public works. 
Request Type and Volume by Citizen Gender 
Male citizens have greater rates of contacts with local councilors; they ask for sixty 
percent of all requests (despite making up half the population) and are more likely than women 
to request every type of service mentioned in the survey. When it comes to personal service 
requests, fifty-two percent of “Other” requests are made by men, fifty-five percent of requests for 
healthcare are from men, and fifty-seven and fifty-eight percent of requests for electrical and 
water come from men, respectively (Figure 4).  
The gender gap grows even greater for public works requests. Sixty percent of requests 
for roads come from men (p<.01); sixty-two percent of requests for telephone and government 
documents (p.>001) come from men. Sixty-three percent of employment requests come from 
men. Sixty-five percent of requests for housing come from men (p<.05) and seventeen percent of 
requests for transportation come from men. Men and women may have different policy 
preferences and thus approach leaders of about issues, as Chattopadhyay and Duflo suggest 
regarding India.50 Or, due to male citizens’ advantages accumulating homosocial capital, they 




                                                          




Figure 4. Requests by citizen gender 
 
Source: LGPI. ***p<.001, **p<.01, p<.05. 
 
Evaluating the Impact of Electing and Appointing Women 
To what extent does homosociality in citizen-local councilor networks explain the gender 
gap in service and allocation responsiveness? Does electing women decrease the gap?51 
Measurement 
                                                          
51 This item measures whether respondents made requests, not whether they actually received the 
services or resources.  
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To measure the dependent variables, service and allocation responsiveness, I use an item 
measuring whether the respondent knows a member of his or her Majlis Baladiyya (Local 
council)/Niabba Khassousiya (Special Delegation), which is relevant for predicting who is likely 
to be able to access a councilor. To measure service responsiveness, I use an item measuring 
whether the respondent contacted a member of the Majlis Baladiyya (Local council)/Niabba 
Khassousiya (Special Delegation) during the last year, followed by the gender of the councilor. 
Questions about whether the interaction concerned a personal problem measures service 
responsiveness, while questions about whether the contact was about a community problem is 
used to tap allocation responsiveness.52 (See Appendix 2 for question wording). 
 To measure the independent and control variables for the multivariate analysis, I use 
female gender, age in years, and marital status, where never married is zero and married, 
engaged, widowed, separated, or divorced is one. Higher income is measured on a five point 
scale from low (=1) to high (=4). Education has four categories: no schooling (=1), primary (=2), 
secondary (=3), and college or above (=4). Higher religiosity is measured on a scale of one 
(never prays, goes to mosque, or reads/listens to religious literature) and five (often does these 
things). Urban residence is measured according to whether the interview is located in an urban 
(mutadiya=0) or rural (immada=1) commune using the Census designation, and district fixed 
effects are included for the localities.  
Descriptive Statistics 
                                                          
52 Only a few citizens stated that they contacted a member to share an opinion; this is not include 
in the analysis. 
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First, I examine bivariate relationships between the dependent variables and respondent 
gender. In support of H1, I find a thirteen percentage point gender gap in the extent to which 
citizens know a councilor from their municipality (Figure 5). Twenty-nine percent of men and 
sixteen percent of women know a councilor (p<.001). In addition, men are more likely than 
women by six percentage points to contact local councilors about any issue, whether personal or 
community related. Seventeen percent of men and eleven percent of women have contacted a 
member of a local council in the last year, a statistically significant difference (p<.000). When 
broken down by request type, nine percent of men and five percent of women contacted a 
councilor about a personal problem, while eight percent of men and five percent of women 
contacted a councilor about a community problem, both statistically significant differences 
(p<.001). Overall, women who consulted a councilor reported being more satisfied than did men 
(p<.05).53 Women may be more likely to have their problems resolved, or they may be more 
prone to agreeableness in responding to attitudinal questions.54 
                                                          
53 This difference is not statistically significant in the multivariate model. 
54 This is consistent with other survey data collected in Tunisia three years earlier in 2012 by 
Ellen Lust, Lindsay Benstead, and Dhafer Malouche. In the nationally-representative Tunisian 
Post Election Survey (TPES), which surveyed 1,200 respondents, males were also more likely 
than females to ask councilors for help with community problems or to express an opinion. 
Thirty-four percent of males and sixteen percent of females did so—a gender gap of eighteen 
percentage points. Women tend to ask local councilors for individualized services such as 
employment and healthcare, while males are more able to share an opinion or ask for community 
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Figure 5. Gender gaps in interactions with local councilors 
 
Figure 5 shows significant gender gaps in citizens interacting with local councilors. ***p<.001, 
**p<.01, p<.05 Question Wording: Do you personally know any local council members in this 
municipality? In the last year, have you contacted a member of the Majlis Baladiyya (Local 
council)/Niabba Khassousiya (Special Delegation)? The last time you contacted a member of the 
local council, was it about a personal or community problem? (The last time you contacted an 
official), were you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied 
with the response?   
 
Overall, the data suggest that males’ advantages accumulating homosocial capital 
account for the gender gap in responsiveness. Men are more able to approach male councilors 
than are women, in support of H1. Males are more likely by a large margin to approach male 
                                                          
issues such as infrastructure and water. This raises questions about substantive representation of 
women’s issues when women are more able to bring community requests to female councilors, 




councilors than female citizens in the sample as a whole.55 When it comes to personal services 
and community resources, about 63 percent of those who contact male councilors are male, 
compared to thirty-six percent who are female. Male councilors are approached more often to 
supply services and community resources than are female councilors. This suggests that because 
male citizens are more likely to know councilors than are female citizens, councilors are more 
responsiveness to the needs of men than women (Figure 6).  
 Yet, women are more likely to be able to contact female than male councilors, in support 
of H2. Fifty-five percent of those who contact female councilors are female, compared to forty-
five percent who are male. Women are especially likely to use networks with female councilors 
for community resource requests. Sixty-two percent of those who contact female councilors for 
help with club goods are female compared to thirty-seven percent who are male. Yet, this does 
not extend to asking for personal services. Males are slightly more likely to contact female 
councilors for personal services than are females, with male accounting for fifty-two percent of 
those who contact female councilors. This supports H3, which suggests that female councilors 
are more welcoming to female citizens than male councilors, and that to a significant extent they 




                                                          
55 When examining interactions at the municipal level, men are significantly more likely to 
contact a local councilor in six of the eighteen municipalities (p<.05). The difference is not 
statistically significant in twelve municipalities.  












Figure 6. Percentage requesting help with a personal or community problem by citizen 
and local councilor gender 
 






 Logistic regression using fixed effects for municipalities shows that these gender 
differences in service and allocation responsiveness are robust when controlling for respondent 
age, marital status, income, education, religiosity, and rural or urban residence, in support of H1 
(Table 2 & 3). All else being equal, women are twelve percent less likely than men to know a 
councilor personally (Model 1). And, women are 6 percent less likely to have contacted a 
councilor during the last year (Model 2), three percent less likely to have asked for help with a 
personal problem (Model 3), and 2 percent less likely to have asked for help regarding a 









Table 2. Determinants of knowing and contacting a councilor 
Model Model 1 Model 2 
Independent variables Knowing councilor Contacting councilor (all contacts) 








Individual-level     
 Female -.78(.09)*** -.12(.01)*** -.56(.11)*** -.06(.01)*** 
 Higher age .01(.00)* .00(.00)* .01(.00)* .00(.00)* 
 Married .55(.13)*** .08(.02)*** .50(.15)*** .05(.01)*** 
 Higher income -.18(.06)** -.03(.01)** .15(.07)* .01(.01)* 
 Higher education .25(.06)*** .04(.01)*** .32(.07)*** .03(.01)*** 
 Higher religiosity .01(.02) .00(.00) .00(.02) .011(.00) 
 Rural municipality .04(.15) .01(.02) -.06(.19) -.01(.02) 
     
N 3,306  3,560  
χ2 (24)=350.35***  (24)=212.84**
* 
 
Pseudo R2 .0999  .0754  
†p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. District fixed effects 
omitted. 1 ∂y/∂x for variable means, change of dummy variables from 0-1. Reference group: Respondent 
with median level on all independent variables. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of service responsiveness (contacting a councilor about a personal 
service or community problem) 
Model Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables Contacting councilor (Personal service) Contacting councilor (Community 
problem) 








Individual-level     
 Female -.59(.14)*** -.03(.01)*** -.43(.15)** -.02(.01)** 
 Higher age .01(.01) .00(.00) .01(.01)† .00(.00)† 
 Married .38(.20)† .02(.01)* .53(.22)*.02 .02(.01)** 
 Higher income .23(.09)** .01(.00)** .03(.09) .00(.00) 
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 Higher education .29(.09)** .02(.00)** .27(**) .01(.00)** 
 Higher religiosity .01(.02) .00(.00) .00(.03) .00(.00) 
 Rural municipality -.25(.25) -.01(.01) .11(.27) .01(.01) 
     
N 3,553  3,553  
χ2 (24)=131.04***  (24)=101.72**
* 
 
Pseudo R2 .0722  .0608  
†p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. See Table 2. 
 The models also show that women are no more or less likely to contact a female 
councilor, but they are six percent less likely, all else being equal, to contact a male councilor 
(Table 4).57 While women are as able to contact female councilors, they are less able to contact 
male councilors than male citizens, in support of H2. And, males are equally able to contact 
female councilors as male councilors, in support of H3. This suggests that while electing and 
appointing women reduces the gender gaps in access to services, it does so by empowering 
women, not by excluding men. 
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of service responsiveness (contacting a councilor), by councilor 
gender 
Model Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variables Contacting councilor (All contacts), 
Female councilor only 
Contacting councilor (All contact),  
Male councilor only 








Individual-level     
 Female .11(.20) .00(.00) -.66(.12)*** -.06(.01)*** 
 Higher age -.02(.01) -.00(.00) .01(.00)* .00(.00)* 
 Married .58(.40) .01(.00)† .55(.17)*** .04(.01)*** 
 Higher income .07(.20) .00(.00) .25(.07)*** .02(.01)*** 
 Higher education .48(.22)* .01(.00)* .37(.08)*** .03(.01)*** 
                                                          





 Higher religiosity -.04(.06) -.00(.00) .01(.02) .00(.00) 
 Rural municipality -.58(.39) -.01(.00)† -.12(.13) -.01(.01) 
     
N 3,499  3,499  
χ2 (7)=18.05*  (7)=86.89***  
Pseudo R2 .0350  .0367  
†p<.10 /*p<.05/ **p<.01/***p<.001 two-tailed test. See Table 2. 
 In addition, poorer (p<.01), older (p<.05), married (p<.001), and more educated (p<.000) 
citizens are more likely to know a councilor personally, while religiosity and rural residence are 
not significant predictors of knowing a counselor. However, the poor are less able to actually 
contact local councilors about their concerns. Accordingly to the LGPI, wealthier (p<.05), older 
(p<.05), married (p<.001), and more educated (p<.000) citizens are more likely to have contacted 
a councilor during the last year, to have asked for a personal or community problem, and to have 
been satisfied with the result. This suggests that Tunisia’s highly informal local politics with 
weak councils benefits not only men, but other advantaged populations as well. The poor may 
know councilors, but this does not ensure responsiveness to their needs. 
Conclusion and Implications 
The results show large gender gaps in knowing and contacting councilors—a thirteen and 
six percentage point difference, respectively, in bivariate tests. Electing and appointing women 
to office reduces this gap because women tend to have more females in their networks than do 
men. Thus, electing women to office is likely to have a minimal impact on men’s ability to ask 
for services. In no municipality were women significantly more likely to have contacted a local 
councilor than were men, while in six of eighteen municipalities, males were significantly more 
likely to have done so. 
Women in Tunisia were also less likely to contact male councilors, especially when it 
comes to requests for community resources, which require closer relationships common in 
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homosocial networks. Women’s marginalization from linkages with male councilors underscores 
the need for gender quotas for legislative assemblies at national, regional, and local levels in 
clientelistic settings. 
Ultimately, however, the steep gender gaps in knowing and contacting local officials 
underscores the need for democratic development and decentralization. When local councils are 
weak, representation will be more personalized and informal, leading to advantages for men, 
who have more resources and relationships with officials. Tunisia’s local councils also appear to 
be more responsive for more affluent segments of society. Policymakers should strengthen rule 
of law, bolster local councils’ independence and policymaking prerogatives, and improve 
councilors’ capacity to serve the constituency through funding for local offices and staff. By 
strengthening local councils and decreasing clientelism, all groups, including women, will have 
more equal access to elected and appointed officials. 
Women receive comparatively fewer requests for help than do male councilors, and 
requests to females are rarely for public works like water or roads. Instead, female councilors 
most often receive requests for education, telephone, and government documents and licenses. 
Some work frames gender differences in requests as reflecting different policy preferences.58 But, 
gendered power structures, including male dominance in some professions and greater clout with 
the central government, could also produce differences in what men and women ask for. As a 
result, male citizens are also more likely than females to be able to request community resources 
from male councilors. This is troubling and suggests that quotas do not automatically alter 
gendered power structures or lead to gender parity in representation in a clientelistic system. 
                                                          
58 Chattopadhyay and Duflo, “Women as Policy Makers.” 
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The LGPI also shows large sub-national variation in women’s access to services as well 
as overall service provision, that must be addressed in further research. For instance, the 
proportion of women who have asked for help from any councilor ranges from 0.9 percent in 
Jebel-Jelloud (governorate of Tunis) to 26.7 percent in Moknine (governorate of Monastir) 
(Table 1). As an urban, affluent district in which women are expected to have limited contact 
with local councilors, Tunis’s large gender gap in access to local councilors is surprising. 
Explaining variation across localities is a puzzle that merits investigation. 
Data from nationally-representative surveys in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia also find 
similar gender gaps in access to help from local councilors, suggesting that the results are likely 
to generalize outside Tunisia (Appendix 1). The nationally representative surveys also suggest 
that gender gaps at the local level are at least as large as gaps for access to parliamentarians. This 
runs contrary to assumptions that females might have more trouble contacting national than local 
elites. But it also underscores the need to understand how electing women at different levels of 
government shapes service, allocation, and policy responsiveness. 
Given that Tunisia is the most gender equal society in the MENA region, that gender 
gaps in access to services exist also suggests that gaps are likely to be much larger in other 
countries which do not have the same history of state feminism experienced by Tunisia. At the 
same time, the election of a large number of women in Tunisia in the most recent municipal 
elections in 2018—forty-seven percent—raises questions about how increasing descriptive 
representation shapes substantive representation of women. 
Women’s presence may also have symbolic effects, particularly as they are present in 
their municipalities and respond to citizens’ requests for services and club goods. Symbolic 
effects can take the form of decreasing biases against females at the polls and changing social 
41 
 
attitudes about women as political leaders, or broader impacts such as encouraging women to 
vote, pursue education, or take on leadership roles.59 As women become engaged in local 
government and provide services to their constituents, public biases against females as local 
councilors may also decrease. Yet, more research needs to be done to examine these effects.  
The results extend existing work on gender and governance by examining service and 
allocation effects among local councilors and underscoring the findings of previous studies that 
women are less likely to demand clientelistic services because they are more marginalized from 
networks with political elites. While gender gaps in access to services exist, another perhaps 
more serious problem is that women are less able to ask for help with community problems when 
few females serve in local councils.  
The findings further underscore the importance of strong quotas, such as those 
implemented in Tunisia for its 2018 municipal elections, as a means of achieving gender parity at 
all levels of government. Quotas ensuring at least parity in elected government are needed, but 
similar measures in other sectors in the public and private sector are also critical for addressing 
underlying gendered power structures.  
Moreover, decentralization is needed to ensure greater regional equity in state resource 
distribution and improve the transparency and effectiveness of service provision. Ultimately, 
continued democratic development and decentralization are crucial in Tunisia in order to 
strengthen the prerogatives of local councils and decrease the extent to which informality 
                                                          








Appendix 1: Interactions with Local Officials in Morocco and Algeria 
According to nationally representative surveys of 800 Moroccans and 800 Algerians,60 
men are more likely than women in Morocco and Algeria to say that they would seek help from 
local or regional assembly members for government services or jobs, consistently with H1. As 
shown in Figure A1, women in Morocco state more often than men that they would contact a 
local or regional councilor for help with government services—fifty-six percent of men and 
sixty-six percent of women—a reverse gap of ten percent. However, men were more likely to 
state that they would contact a local official first about government services (nine percent of men 
compared to five percent of women) and that it would be most effective (twelve percent of men 
compared to nine percent of women).  
In Algeria, seventy-six percent of men and seventy-one percent of women would contact 
a local or regional councilor for help with government services. Six percent of men and one 
percent of women would do this first, while nine percent of men and eight percent of women 
believe contacting a local councilor would be the most effective. However, when asked about 
getting a job, women in Algeria were slightly more likely than men to state that they would 
contact a local or regional official, that they would try it first, or that they believe it would be 
most effective. These findings generally support H1 and provide compelling, though not 
surprising, evidence of gender gaps in access to local and regional councilors in Morocco and 
Algeria. That reverse gender gaps exist in Algeria for seeking a government job suggests that 
inequalities in service provision depend on the type of service or individualized benefit sought. 
                                                          




Figure A1. Percentage willing to contact local and regional officials in Morocco and Algeria 
 
Source: Constituent Survey (2007-2008). Question wording. “If you need to deal with the 
government, such as to gain access to government housing programs, resolve a problem with the 
health or education system, dispute taxes, or apply for licenses, would you: Ask a local 
government authority such as the APC or the APW to mediate? Which would you be most likely 























































































































































































































































































Morocco (2002-2007) Algeria (2002-2007)
Male Female Gender gap
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Appendix 2: Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics 
Table A2.1. Question Wording for Interactions with Local Councilors 
404. In the last year, have you contacted a member of the Majlis Baladiyya (Local 
council)/Niabba Khassousiya (Special Delegation)? 
1. Yes  2. No (skip to 405)  96. Don’t know 
(skip to 405) 
97. Refuse to answer (skip 
to 405) 
404.1. The last time you contacted a member of the local council, was it about a personal or 
community problem? 
1. Personal 2. community problem  96. Don’t know  97. Refuse to answer  
 
404.2 (The last time you contacted a member of the local council) what type of issue did you 
address? [Read out categories 1 to 6. More than one answer possible.] 
1. Employment 2. License or government 
document 
3. Electricity  
4. Water 5. Telephone or Internet 6. Healthcare 
7. Education 8. Housing 9. Roads  
10. Transportation 9. Other (specify): _______ 96. Don’t know 
97. Refuse to answer 98. Doesn’t apply  
404.3 (The last time you contacted an official) was the member you contacted male or 
female? 
1. Male 2. Female 97. Refuse to answer 
 
404.4 (The last time you contacted an official), were you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, 
somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the response?   




4. Very dissatisfied  
96. Don’t know 97. Refuse to answer 98. Doesn’t apply  
 
405. If you had a personal problem in the future that one of the members of the local council 
could do something about, do you think he or she would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, 
or not very helpful? 
1. Very helpful 2. Somewhat helpful 3. Not very helpful 
96. Don’t know 97. Refuse to answer  
 
405.1 Do you personally know any local council members in this municipality? 





Table A2.2. Question Wording for Independent Variables in Table 2 and 3 
Female: Male (48.9%), Female (51.1%). Mean=.51, S.d.=.50. 
 
Higher age: Age in years (Range=18-102 years). Mean=43.62, S.d.=16.61. 
 
Married: Never married (27.80%), Married, engaged, widowed, separated, or divorced (72.20%). 
Mean=.72, S.d.=.45 
 
Higher income: 1 (18.07%), 2 (49.00%), 3 (23.93%), 4 (9.01%). Mean=2.24, S.d.=.85. 
 
Higher education: 1 (8.94%), 2 (19.07%), 3 (36.89%), 4 (35.10%). Mean=2.98, S.d.=.95. 
 
Higher religiosity: Range (1-9). “On a scale of 1-5 which number better represents you if 5 
means a person who goes to houses of worship daily, takes religious lessons, listens to religious 
programs and reads religious books, while the number 1 means a person who rarely does these 
things?” Mean=4.51, S.d.=2.80.  
 
Rural: Rural (28.0%), Urban (72%). Census designation. Mean=.28, S.d.=.45. 
Source: LGPI. 
 
